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Rethinking Treaty Shopping: Lessons for the 
European Union 
Reuven S. A vi-Yonah and Christiana HTI Panayi 
1. Introduction 
Whilst treaty shopping is not a new phenomenon, it remains as controver­
sial as ever. It would seem that the more countries try to deal with it, the 
wider the disagreements as to what is improper treaty shopping and what is 
legitimate tax planning. 
In this paper, we reassess the traditional quasi-definitions of treaty shop­
ping in an attempt to delineate the contours of such practices. We examine 
the various theoretical arguments advanced to justify the campaign against 
treaty shopping. 
We also consider the current trends in treaty shopping and the anti-treaty­
shopping policies under the OECD Model and the US Model. We focus 
on recent cases on beneficial ownership. Finally, we examine the possible 
implications of EU law on the treaty shopping debate. 
2. Treaty shopping and improper use of tax treaties 
2.1. Finding the contours of treaty shopping 
The term "treaty shopping" is thought to have originated in the United 
States. The analogy was drawn with the term "forum shopping", which 
described the situation in US civil procedure whereby a litigant tried to 
"shop" between jurisdictions in which he expected a more favourable 
decision to be rendered.1 David Rosenbloom, who served as International 
Tax Counsel in the US Treasury Department during 1977-198 1, described 
the phenomenon as "the practice of some investors of 'borrowing' a tax 
treaty by forming an entity (usually a corporation) in a country having a 
favourable tax treaty with the country of source -that is, the country where 
1 .  Becker, H. and F.J. Wiirm, Treaty Shopping: An Emerging Tax Issue and its 
Present Status in Various Countries (Deventer: Kluwer, 1988), p. 2. 
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the investment is to be made and the income in question is to be eamed".2 In 
other words, a person "shops" into an otherwise unavailable treaty through 
complicated structures; hence the term "treaty shopping".3 
The term "treaty shopping" has never featured in any versions of the 
OECD Model. Nor has it been properly defined or explained in the OECD 
Commentary. Rather, the emphasis is always on eliminating treaty shop­
ping and the measures that can be taken against it. Most of the references to 
treaty shopping are references by default; i.e. when discussing anti-treaty­
shopping provisions. For example, references to the "problem commonly 
referred to as 'treaty-shopping"'4 are made for the first time in the OECD 
Commentary on Art. 1, when discussing Limitation-of-Benefits (LOB) pro­
visions and how these provisions are meant "to address the issue [of treaty­
shopping] in a comprehensive way".5 A description of treaty shopping is 
given indirectly and in very general terms. It is stated that LOB provisions 
are there to address treaty shopping. Then it is stated that LOB provisions 
are "aimed at preventing persons who are not residents of either Contract­
ing States from accessing the benefits of a Convention through the use of 
an entity that would otherwise qualify as a resident of one of these States".6 
Treaty shopping features in a similarly elusive way in the new Technical Expla­
nation to the 2006 US Model? The term "treaty shopping" is used in the Tech­
nical Explanation when describing the function of anti-treaty-shopping pro­
visions. 8 The new Technical Explanation to the Limitation on Benefits clause 
2. Rosenbloom, D., "Derivative Benefits: Emerging US Treaty Policy", 22 Inter-
tax 2 (1994), p. 83. 
3. The concept was traced back to the early 1970s at the US Congressional Hearings 
on Offshore Tax Havens. See US Congress, Offshore Tax Havens, Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Comm. On Ways and Means, 96th Congr. I st 
Session (1977) and Rosenbloom, D., "Tax Treaty Abuse: Policies and Issues", 1 5  Law & 
Pol'y Int'l Bus. (1983), p. 763. 
4. 2008 OECD Commentary to Art. I, Para. 20. 
5 .  Id. 
6. Id. 
7. The phrase "improper use of tax treaties" is not used anywhere in the Technical 
Explanation to the 2006 US Model. Neither was it used in the Technical Explanation to 
the 1996 US Model. 
8. 2006 Technical Explanation, p. 63. Contrast with the Technical Explanation to the 
1996 US Model where it is stated that "[a] treaty that provides treaty benefits to any resi­
dent of a Contracting State permits 'treaty-shopping': the use, by residents of third states, 
of legal entities established in a Contracting State with a principal purpose to obtain the 
benefits of a tax treaty between the United States and the other Contracting State". The 
1996 Technical Explanation emphasised that this definition "does not encompass every 
case in which a third state resident establishes an entity in a US treaty partner, and that 
entity enjoys treaty benefits to which the third state resident would not itself be entitled. 
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found in Art. 22 states that this article "contains anti-treaty-shopping provisions 
that are intended to prevent residents of third countries from benefiting from 
what is intended to be a reciprocal agreement between two countries". 
If one looks at the quasi-definitions of treaty shopping, what one notes is that 
the term "treaty shopping", as used, may encompass a broad spectrum of struc­
tures, ranging from the purely abusive and artificial ones to others with more 
substance. However, are all these instances of improper use of tax treaties? 
The OECD Commentary seems to perpetuate this confusion. The descriptions 
given in Paras. 9 and 20 of the OECD Commentary to Art. 1 would seem 
to catch general forms of treaty shopping; i.e. treaty shopping without tax 
haven or conduit connotations. However, the examples given in Para. 1 1  of 
the Commentary would seem to catch treaty shopping of a more specific and 
abusive nature; i.e. treaty shopping through conduits and/or base companies. 
Therefore, there are the two obvious ends of the spectrum: treaty shopping 
through conduits and bona fide commercial structures. The typical scenario 
of treaty shopping through conduits, as also described in the OECD Conduit 
Companies Report, is the following. 
No P·S benefits, 
restricted benefits 
under tax treaty S/P 
State P 
I Company PI 
State S 
Treaty reduces or eliminates State 
R withholding taxes 
Treaty reduces or eliminates 
State S withholding taxes 
No domestic 
tax in State R 
on Company 
R due to 
special tax 
L-_____ __, regime 
A holding Company R would be organized in a State R that has beneficial 
tax provisions both with a State S where a subsidiary Company S is located 
and with a State P where its parent Company P is located. Company R 
would typically be controlled by Company P and Company S would itself 
be controlled by Company R. 
If the third country resident had substantial reasons for establishing the structure that 
were unrelated to obtaining treaty benefits, the structure would not fall within the defini­
tion of treaty-shopping." 
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If the income from Company S is paid directly to Company P, it is sub­
ject to State S withholding tax with very few (if any) treaty benefits. The 
income to Company P is, however, tax exempt (or receives beneficial tax 
treatment) if channelled through Company R. This may be, if the income is 
in the form of dividends, by virtue of a parent-subsidiary regime under the 
domestic law of State R or a participation exemption or due to a convention 
between States S and R. This is the obvious case where there is minimal or 
zero other activity. 
Therefore, treaty shopping of a clearly improper nature would entail the 
following: 
the beneficial owner (Company P) of the treaty shopping entity 
(Company S) does not reside in the country where the entity is created; 
the interposed company (Company R) has minimal economic activity 
in the jurisdiction in which it is located; and 
the income is subject to minimal (if any) tax in the country of residence 
of the interposed company. 
There could be many variations of this structure. For example, it may be 
possible to use more than one tax treaty and move the funds through several 
countries, in the process of which, the funds may change their character 
(e.g. dividends transformed to interest).9 
However, as already mentioned, this is only one end of the spectrum. 
A treaty shopping structure could be imbued by different degrees of artifi­
ciality. The intermediary company could be a complete sham or could have 
some de minimis economic substance or the arrangement could be a bona 
fide commercial nature.10 Surely, not all instances of third-country residents 
benefitting from tax treaties to which their own countries are not privy are 
examples of improper use. 
Whilst one may more readily distinguish a complete sham from a bona fide 
commercial arrangement - not always easy, as it depends on the jurisdic­
tional perspectives on tax planning - the disputes (and litigation) usually 
9. For a description of various treaty-shopping arrangements, see OECD Conduit 
Companies Report in OECD, Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the OECD, International 
Tax Avoidance and Evasion, Four Related Studies, Double Taxation Conventions and the 
Use of Conduit Companies, Issues in International Taxation Series, No. 1 (Paris: OECD, 
1987), (hereafter: OECD Conduit Companies Report). 
10. For further analysis, see HJI Panayi, C., Double Taxation, Tax Treaties, Treaty 
Shopping and the European Community , EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, 
Vol. 1 5  (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2007), Chapters 2 and 5. 
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relate to the borderline cases. Successive Models and Commentaries have 
done little to clarify the confusion. In fact, they seem to perpetuate it. This 
may be deliberate. It is certainly to the advantage of the tax authorities to 
have discretion to determine on an ad hoc basis what is improper treaty 
shopping and what is legitimate tax planning. 
It also seems that the traditional theoretical objections to treaty shopping do 
not make a more convincing case. Nor are they targeted against wholly arti­
ficial arrangements. This has important implications on how treaty shop­
ping is tackled in various jurisdictions. 
2.2. Theoretical objections to treaty shopping 
Treaty shopping is, arguably, an instrument of international tax plan­
ning. What is it about this kind of tax planning that makes it objection­
able? A number of arguments have been advanced in the international tax 
community. 1 1  
Firstly, i t  has been argued that treaty shopping is  an instance of tax avoid­
ance and as such improper and contrary to the purposes of tax treaties. 
It has also been argued that treaty shopping breaches the reciprocity of 
a treaty and alters the balance of concessions attained therein between 
the two contracting states.12 When a third-country resident "shops" into a 
1 1 . See, inter alios, Rosenbloom, D. and S. Langbein, "United States Tax Treaty 
Policy: An Overview", 19 Colum. J. Transnational Law ( 198 1), p. 359; Rosenbloom, 
D., 15 Law & Pol'y lnt'l Bus. (1983), p. 763; Becker and Wiirm, Treaty Shopping: An 
Emerging Tax Issue and its Present Status in Various Countries ( 1988); van Weeghel, 
S., T he Improper Use of Tax Treaties , Series on International Taxation, No. 19 (London, 
Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998); Reinhold, R.L., "What is Tax Treaty Abuse? 
(Is Treaty Shopping an Outdated Concept?)", 53 Tax Lawyer 3 (2000), p. 663; Grady, 
K.A., "Income Tax Treaty Shopping: An Overview of Prevention Techniques", 5 Nw. 
J. lnt'l L. & Bus. (1983-4), p. 626; Roin, J.A., "Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strate­
gic World with Disparate Tax Systems", 8 1  Virginia Law Review 7 (1995), p. 1 753; 
Loengard, R.O. Jr., "Foreign Investors and Nimble Capital: Another Look at the U.S. 
Policy Towards Treaty Shopping", Tax Forum 439 (1988), pp. 25-26; Streng, W.P., 
"Treaty Shopping: Tax Treaty Limitation of Benefits Issues", 15 Houston Journal of 
International Law 1 ( 1992), pp. 1 -66; Terr, L.O., "Treaty Routing v. Treaty Shopping: 
Planning for multi-country investment flows under modem limitation on benefits 
articles", 17 lntertax 12 ( 1989), p. 521 .  
1 2 .  This argument has been produced in both the OECD Report on Conduit Compa­
nies (Para. 7(a)) and the UN Report on the Prevention of Abuse of Tax Treaties. OECD 
Conduit Companies Report, Para. 7(a); UN Department of International Economic and 
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treaty, then the treaty concessions are extended to a resident, whose state 
has not participated in this arrangement and may not reciprocate with cor­
responding benefits (e.g. exchange of information). The usual quid pro quo 
of the treaty is therefore compromised and the process subverted. 
Another argument is based on the principle of economic allegiance. Pursu­
ant to economic allegiance, a taxable base is attributable to the jurisdiction 
in which it is thought to owe its economic existence. Tax treaties are pre­
mised on the allocation of taxing rights according to this principle. Treaty 
concessions are of a personal nature and are not to be extended to third­
country residents. As a result of treaty shopping, the third country gains 
revenue power, absent of any (substantial) claim to economic allegiance. 13 
Furthermore, it is often claimed that treaty shopping creates a disincentive 
for countries to negotiate tax treaties. If third countries can get the ben­
efits of reduced taxation for their residents without conferring reciprocal 
benefits to non-resident investors, then there is no need to enter into a tax 
treaty, especially if there are concerns that the tax treaty might be imbal­
anced.14 This may put countries which comply with their duties of fiscal 
co-operation arising through tax treaties (e.g. exchange of information), 
at a competitive disadvantage internationally. Furthermore, lack of fiscal 
co-operation enhances opportunities for international tax evasion.15 
Finally, it is argued that treaty shopping is often linked with (undesired) 
revenue loss.16 Tax treaties are based on a perceived level of balance of 
actual and potential income and capital flows between one country and the 
other.17 When the benefits of the given treaty are abused, the level and bal­
ance of these flows are distorted, with a resulting distortion in the share of 
the relevant chargeable income channelled to each state. Treaty shopping 
expands the normal bilateral relationship of the treaty. A generous treaty 
Social Affairs, Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International Co-operation in Tax Matters, 
Contributions to international co-operation in tax matters: treaty shopping, thin 
capitalization, co-operation between tax authorities, resolving international tax disputes 
(New York: United Nations, 1988) UN Doc. ST/EA/203, UN Sales No. E.88.XVI, p. 6 
(hereafter: UN-Report (1988)). 
13 .  Rosenbloom and Langbein, 19 Colum. J. Transnational Law ( 198 1), pp. 359, 
397-8. 
14. Conduit Companies Report, Para. 7 (c); Becker and Wiirm, Treaty Shopping 
( 1988), p. 6; Rosenbloom and Langbein, 19 Colum. J. Transnational Law (1981),  p. 676. 
15 .  Rosenbloom and Langbein, 19 Colum. J. Transnational Law ( 1981), pp. 396-397. 
16. Also see Rosenbloom and Langbein, 19 Colum. J. Transnational Law (198 1), 
p. 84. 
1 7. UN Report (1988), p. 6. 
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with one trading partner becomes a treaty with the world. 18 This de facto 
multilateralization of the tax treaty is thought to entail a large and indeter­
minate cost to the source country. 19 
As for the first argument, it is never an easy task to distinguish between 
(international) tax avoidance and legitimate tax planning. What is it about 
treaty shopping that makes it an instance of the former rather than the 
latter? Why is it assumed that all forms of treaty shopping, irrespective of 
their degree of artificiality, constitute tax avoidance? 
As already mentioned, not all treaty shopping structures can be charac­
terized as artificial and devoid of economic substance. The term "treaty 
shopping", applied generically, may encompass a variety of structures. It 
could encompass structures in which the intermediary company imposed 
is a pure conduit with no economic substance whatsoever, completely 
owned and controlled by the parent company and based in a notorious 
conduit location or tax haven. However, this is only one end of the spec­
trum. There is also the other end, where the intermediary company is a 
company with some substance, conducting its own trading activities, not 
controlled by the parent company and liable to some tax in the country of 
residence. It should always be remembered that an arrangement may be 
imbued with some economic substance that is not immediately apparent 
to the tax authorities. 
As for the reciprocity argument, although persuasive, it is premised on the 
assumption that there is always reciprocity and/or for every treaty benefit. 
This may not always be the case. Some treaty concessions may be unilat­
eral if the other contracting state already provides for them in its domestic 
legislation. Also, whilst there might be reciprocity in the tax treaty, it is 
not guaranteed that the underlying balance of the treaty is a fair one. A tax 
treaty may be biased in favour of the economically more powerful country. 
Therefore, breaching reciprocity may not necessarily mean that a "fair" 
balance has become "unfair". lt is the negotiated balance that is being sub­
verted; whatever the fairness credentials of this balance. 
As for the economic allegiance argument, this seems to be tautological. 
Opinions diverge as to the defining characteristics of economic allegiance; 
in other words, what kind of nexus is required for the duty of economic 
18.  See US Treasury Department's June 27 1979 New Release B-1694 relating to the 
US treaty with the Netherlands Antilles. 
19. Rosenbloom, 22 Intertax 2 ( 1994), p. 84. 
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allegiance to be generated in favour of a jurisdiction. Even if the principle 
of economic allegiance was agreed upon, there are no guarantees that coun­
tries negotiating tax treaties would follow it. In any case, it should not be 
readily assumed that all instances of treaty shopping fall foul of the prin­
ciple of economic allegiance. Some treaty shopping arrangements might 
be more abusive than others, for example, where the conduit country is a 
tax haven or where the conduit company has no other activity other than 
channelling payments to parent companies. In such instances, the principle 
is flagrantly breached as there is no economic activity whatsoever taking 
place in the conduit country that could justify the latter's claim of economic 
allegiance. 
As for the disincentive-to-negotiate argument, in assessing the potency 
of this argument, the self-correcting forces of competition and the inter­
national economic pressure for fiscal convergence should not be ignored. 
Also, it should be pointed out that the competitiveness of foreign inves­
tors can still be preserved by their country of residence if double taxa­
tion is relieved through unilateral means. What is more, it is all too often 
assumed that treaty shopping disincentivizes the third country from enter­
ing into tax treaties and that the source country wants tax treaties. In 
some cases the source country might not want a tax treaty with the third 
country, for example, if the third country is a tax haven or a notorious 
conduit location. 
This is, however, a valid argument. Even if double taxation can be allevi­
ated by unilateral means, there are some reciprocal advantages which can 
only or more easily be achieved through tax treaties (e.g. provisions dealing 
with pensions, students, artists, dispute resolution). Tax treaty networks 
ensure that fiscal collaboration between the contracting states is strength­
ened and adapted to new forms of tax evasion and avoidance. 
Therefore, the concern that treaty shopping creates a disincentive to 
negotiate tax treaties is a valid one, if treaties are entered into for the right 
reasons- that is to keep the momentum for international fiscal convergence 
and co-operation rather than enable one country to bully another into tax 
concessions. 
As for the revenue-loss argument, again, there is no concrete evidence that 
treaty shopping actually causes revenue loss and economic distortions. 
Firstly, it is not easy to calculate the benefits and costs of a tax treaty to 
a contracting state. A contracting state might be both a country of resi­
dence and a country of source and enjoy benefits or bear costs under both 
28 
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capacities. 20 Therefore, finding the costs and benefits that a contracting 
state derives from a tax treaty entails quite complex calculations for which 
there might not be concurrence. 21 Some of the benefits, for example mutual 
assistance, cannot really be translated in monetary terms. 
Secondly, why is there a presumption of a loss? It could be argued that 
when treaty shopping increases economic activity, the overall economic 
gain might exceed source-country losses.22 This begs the question. When 
does treaty shopping increase economic activity and when does it not? 
Does it depend on whether the source country is a developing country? 
For example, in Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan,23 the Indian 
Supreme Court refused to imply an anti-treaty-shopping clause in the 
India-Mauritius tax treaty. In the judgment, the Supreme Court emphasized 
that in developing countries, treaty shopping was often regarded as a tax 
incentive to attract scarce foreign capital or technology. "Developing 
countries need foreign investments, and the treaty shopping opportunities 
can be an additional factor to attract them".24 Countries had to take a holistic 
view. "The developing countries allow treaty shopping to encourage capital 
and technology inflows, which developed countries are keen to provide to 
them. The loss of tax revenues could be insignificant compared to the other 
non-tax benefits to their economy. Many of them do not appear to be too 
concerned unless the revenue losses are significant compared to the other 
tax and non-tax benefits from the treaty, or the treaty shopping leads to 
other tax abuses."25 Treaty shopping may be a necessary evil, tolerated in a 
developing economy, in the interest of long-term development.26 
Therefore, it ought not to be assumed that treaty shopping always leads to 
losses - in the medium or long term. The loss of tax revenues as a result 
of treaty shopping could be insignificant compared to the other non-tax 
20. Van Weeghel, S.,  The Improper Use of Tax Treaties (1998), p. 122. 
2 1 .  Even the same authors may reach inconsistent conclusions in subsequent reports. 
See, for example, Blonigen, B.A. and R.B. Davies, The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on 
US FDI Activity, NBER Working Paper No. 7929, (Cambridge: NBER, 2000); Blonigen, 
B.A. and R.B. Davies, Do Bilateral Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment, NBER 
Working Paper No. 8834, (Cambridge: NBER, 2002). 
22. Bracewell-Milnes, B., Economics of International Tax Avoidance (Deventer: 
Kluwer, 1 980), p. 23. 
23. Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan [2003] 6 1TLR 233; (2003) SOL 6 19. For 
some commentary, see Baistrocchi, E., "The Use and Interpretation of Tax Treaties in the 
Emerging World: Theory and Implications", British Tax Review 4 (2008), p. 352. 
24. ld., p. 280. 
25. ld., p. 28 1 .  
26. ld. 
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benefits generated in the economy as a result of the influx of capital and 
technology. An argument based on revenue loss and economic distortions 
should factor this in. 
Thirdly, absent a truly neutral tax system, it is difficult to assess any distor­
tions caused by treaty shopping. In fact, it could be argued that the inherent 
non-neutralities of tax systems create an incentive to treaty shop. In other 
words, treaties generate treaty shopping.27 Treaty shopping is perhaps a 
self-help way of lessening or removing fiscal impediments to international 
business imposed by the inadequate relief of international double taxation 
and the incomplete nature of the treaty network. 
Hence, so far, we see (deliberately) inadequate definitions and theoretical 
objections which are somewhat detached from reality. This would go some 
way in explaining the responses to treaty shopping. 
3. Responses to treaty shopping: The OECD and the 
United States 
In this section, we examine how the OECD and the United States have dealt 
with treaty shopping. 
3 1. The OECD approach to treaty shopping 
Some basic methods of curbing treaty shopping practices existed ever since 
the 1977 OECD Model: the beneficial ownership and the limitation on 
residence provisions. In the OECD Conduit Companies Report, the Fiscal 
Affairs Committee recognized the deficiencies of these basic methods28 and 
conceded that the 1 977 Model dealt with conduits in a rudimentary way, 
"expressing only a general concern that improper use of treaties should be 
avoided".29 Other more specific measures were suggested.30 The underly­
ing theme of these measures was that treaty benefits should be available 
only to entities having a sufficient nexus with the country of residence, 
2 7. Avery Jones, J.F., "The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: 'Are tax treaties necessary?"', 
53 Tax Law Review 1 (1999), pp. 3-8; Spence, 1., "Globalisation of Transnational Busi­
ness: The Challenge for International Tax Policy", 25 /ntertax 4 (1997), pp. 143-144. 
28. OECD Conduit Companies Report, Paras. 13-15. 
2 9. Id., Para. 15. 
30. Id., Para. 10. 
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either because of direct or indirect ownership of the entity or because of the 
economic ties between the entity and the treaty country. 
These suggestions were subsequently incorporated in the 1992 Commen­
tary to Art. 1 and updated in the 2003 Commentary following the 2002 
OECD Report on Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits. There have 
been no further amendments in the 2008 update to the OECD Commen­
tary. The current OECD Commentary still does not offer a uniform solution 
for tackling improper use. However, it sets out the solutions, as suggested 
benchmarks that treaty negotiators might consider when searching for a 
solution to specific cases. These are the beneficial ownership approach,31 
the look-through approach,32 the channel approach,33 the limitation on 
31. The beneficial ownership provision which is found in Arts. 10 to 12 of the 
OECD Model precludes the extension of specific treaty benefits to entities which are 
not beneficial owners of the particular income, even if they are formal recipients of it. 
Neither the OECD Model nor its Commentary gives a definition of the term "beneficial 
owner". However, a substance over form approach is preferred. 
32. Look-through clauses focus on direct and indirect ownership of the entity. The 
typical wording of the clause reads as follows: 
"A company that is a resident of a Contracting State shall not be entitled to relief from 
taxation under this Convention with respect to any item of income, gains or profits if it 
is owned or controlled directly or through one or more companies, wherever resident, by 
persons who are not residents of a Contracting State." (OECD Commentary, Para. 14); 
It is up to the contracting states to agree on the criteria according to which a company 
would be considered to be owned or controlled by non-residents. 
33. The channel approach, also called base erosion, seeks to catch intermediary enti­
ties whose tax base is eroded in favour of third-country residents (usually controlling 
shareholders or associated persons) through the payment of interest or royalties or by the 
discharge of obligations. The typical wording of a channel clause reads as follows: 
"Where income arising in a Contracting State is received by a company resident of the other 
Contracting State and one or more persons not resident in that other Contracting State: 
( 1 )  have directly or indirectly or through one or more companies, wherever resident, 
a substantial interest in such company, in the form of a participation or otherwise, and 
(2) exercise directly or indirectly, alone or together, the management or control of such 
company, any provision of this Convention conferring an exemption from, or a reduction 
of, tax shall not apply if more than 50 per cent of such income is used to satisfy claims 
by such persons (including interest, royalties, development, advertising, initial and travel 
expenses, depreciation of any kind of business assets including those on immaterial 
goods, processes etc)." 
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residence approach,34 the exclusion approach35 and the subject-to-tax 
approach36• 
The first three methods focus on the ownership of the intermediary entity 
and its relationship with the actual recipient of the payment. Their aim is to 
ensure that that tax treaty benefits are forfeited when the formal recipient 
of the income is not actually entitled to the income or the income will most 
certainly be passed on to a third-country resident. The last three methods 
focus on taxation in the country of residence. Their aim is to ensure that tax 
treaty benefits on source-country income are forfeited when the income is 
not taxed in the country of residence of the recipient entity but passes on to 
a third-country resident.37 
It is recommended in the OECD Commentary that all of the above 
approaches be accompanied by "specific provisions to ensure that treaty 
benefits will be granted in bona fide cases".38 Various bona fide provisions 
34. The limitation on residence features in Art. 4 of the OECD Model. The article 
reads as follows: 
"[ . . .  ] the term 'resident of a Contracting State' means any person who, under the laws 
of that State, is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of man­
agement or any other criterion of a similar nature, and also includes that State and any 
political subdivision or local authority thereof. This term, however, does not include any 
person who is liable to tax in that State in respect only of income from sources in that 
State or capital situated therein. "  (Emphasis added). 
35. The exclusion approach denies treaty benefits to companies that are tax-exempt or 
nearly tax-exempt. A typical clause would read as follows: 
"No provision of the Convention conferring an exemption from, or reduction of, tax shall 
apply to income received or paid by a company as defined under section [ . . .  ] of [ . . .  ] the 
Act, or under any similar provision enacted by [ . . .  ] after signature of the Convention". 
36. General subject-to-tax provisions provide that source-country treaty benefits are 
granted only if the respective income is subject to tax in the country of residence. The 
subject-to-tax approach, although similar to the exclusion approach, is not confined to 
tax exemptions or reductions in the country of residence. The OECD Model suggests a 
more restrictive clause incorporating a safeguarding provision such as the following. 
"Where income arising in a Contracting State is received by a company resident 
of the other Contracting State and one or more persons not resident in that other 
Contracting State: 
(a) have directly or indirectly or through one or more companies, wherever resident, a 
substantial interest in such company, in the form of participation or otherwise, or 
(b) exercise directly or indirectly, alone or together, the management or control of such 
company, any provision of this Convention conferring an exemption from, or a reduc­
tion of, tax shall apply only to income which is subject to tax in the last-mentioned State 
under the ordinary rules of its tax law". (OECD Commentary, Para. 15). 
37. Panayi, Double Taxation, Tax Treaties, Treaty Shopping and the European 
Community (2007), Chapter 2. 
38. OECD Commentary to Art. 1, Para. 19. 
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were suggested in the OECD Conduit Companies Report39 and subsequently 
added in the OECD Commentary to Art. 1 in July 1992.40 
The 2003 OECD Commentary went further than its predecessors in 
suggesting a comprehensive clause to deal with treaty shopping: the LOB 
clause.41 The Commentary replicates the standard LOB clause found in the 
US Model. 
With the exception of the LOB, most of the OECD anti-treaty-shopping 
provisions tend to be broad and vague, likely to generate interpretational 
difficulties when applied in practice. This is hardly surprising, given the 
definitional inadequacies and the lack of solid theoretical underpinnings 
identified above. 
Some recent cases on beneficial ownership illustrate these difficulties.42 
Beneficial ownership is perhaps the most widely used anti-treaty-shopping 
mechanism. However, the term is not defined in the OECD Model and most 
tax treaties do not contain a definition of beneficial ownership. 43 Moreover, 
the term may not even have a domestic tax meaning. This creates uncer­
tainty when trying to delineate who is the true beneficial owner of income 
when treaty shopping concerns are raised. 
Under the OECD Commentary, the term "is not used in a narrow technical 
sense, rather, it should be understood in its context and in light of the object 
and purposes of the Convention, including avoiding double taxation and 
the prevention of fiscal evasion and avoidance".44 In his authoritative trea­
tise on tax treaties, Professor Philip Baker QC claims that "the 'beneficial 
ownership' limitation is intended to exclude: (a) mere nominees or agents, 
who are not treated as owners of the income in their country of residence; 
(b) any other conduit who though the formal owner of the income, has very 
narrow powers over the income which render the conduit a mere fiduciary 
39. OECD Conduit Companies Report, Para. 42. 
40. See van Weeghel, S., The Improper Use of Tax Treaties ( 1998), p. 216. 
41 .  OECD Commentary 2003, Para. 20. 
42. See Sheppard, L., "Beneficial ownership too onerous?", Tax Analysts, WTD 
176-4 ( l O  September 2008). 
43. For exceptions, see Bernstein, J., "Beneficial Ownership: An international 
perspective", 45 Tax Notes lnt'l (2007), p. 1 2 1 1  (p. 1212). 
44. OECD Commentary to Art. 10, Para. 12. In other words, the limitation of source 
country taxes by virtue of a tax treaty would not be available "when, economically, 
it would benefit a person not entitled to it who interposed the conduit company as 
an intermediary between himself and the payer of the income". See OECD Conduit 
Companies Report, Para. 14(b). 
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or administrator of the income on behalf of the beneficial owner. [T]he 
mere fact that the recipient may be viewed as a conduit does not mean that 
it is not the beneficial owner".45 
Professor Baker argues that "the term [beneficial ownership] should be 
accorded an 'international fiscal meaning' not derived from the domestic 
laws of Contracting States". 46 The salience of the matter lies in determining 
whether a company controlled by another one, and therefore likely but not 
legally obliged to pay to its ultimate owner any sums received, is in fact the 
beneficial owner of such sums.47 
The difficulty of explaining the concept of "beneficial ownership" was 
illustrated in the Indofood case.48 In Indofood, an Indonesian trading group 
(lndofood) wanted to raise finance by issuing internationally marketed 
interest-bearing notes to the public. This was done through a Mauritian 
special purpose vehicle, in order to benefit from the reduced withholding 
tax rate of the Indonesia-Mauritius tax treaty.49 
Two years after the issue of the notes, the Indonesian Government decided to 
terminate the Indonesia-Mauritius tax treaty. This meant that the Indonesian 
withholding tax of 20% would have applied rather than the one under the 
above tax treaty. Following this, Indofood tried to initiate the get-out clause 
of the notes and gave notice to the trustee of the bondholders (JP Morgan) of 
its intention to redeem early.50 The trustee refused to accept early redemp­
tion on the basis that Indofood had not taken reasonable measures to prevent 
this. According to the trustee, one such measure would have been the setting 
45. Baker, P., Double Taxation Conventions, 3rd edn. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2001), Paras. 10B-10.4. 
46. Id., Para. lOB-14. 
47. "As a practical approach, one can ask whose income the dividends (interest/ 
royalties) are in reality. One way to test this is to ask: what would happen if the recipient 
went bankrupt before paying over the income to the intended, ultimate recipient? If the 
ultimate recipient could claim the funds as its own, then the funds are properly regarded 
as already belonging to the ultimate recipient. If, however, the ultimate recipient would 
simply be one of the creditors of the actual recipient (if even that), then the funds prop­
erly belong to the actual recipient." Id., Para. lOB- 15.  
48. Indofood International Finance Ltd v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA (2006) EWCA 
Civ 158. 
49. Had the notes been issued from Indonesia, a 20% withholding tax would have 
been levied on interest. By raising the finance through the Mauritian subsidiary, the with­
holding tax rate was reduced to 10%. There was no further withholding tax in Mauritius. 
50. Under the terms and conditions of the notes, Indofood was entitled to redeem 
early on an adverse change of Indonesian law, if the effect of such adverse change could 
not have been avoided by Indofood taking reasonable measures. 
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up of a Dutch special purpose vehicle to perform the same function as the 
Mauritian one, but using the Indonesia-Netherlands tax treatyY 
The trustee initially succeeded at the High Court. 52 Indofood appealed. One 
of the issues considered by the Court of Appeal was whether a newly inter­
posed Dutch company would have been the beneficial owner of the inter­
est payable by Indofood for the purposes of the Indonesia-Netherlands tax 
treaty. The Court of Appeal decided the question of beneficial ownership in 
favour of Indofood; i.e. the Dutch company could not be a beneficial owner 
of the interest paid by Indofood. 53 
After examining the OECD Commentary, the Court of Appeal confirmed 
that the term "beneficial ownership" should be understood in its context and 
in light of the object and purposes of the OECD Model; namely, the avoid­
ance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion and avoidance. 
The Court of Appeal cited Professor Baker's commentary approvingly. The 
term "beneficial ownership" was to be given an international fiscal meaning 
not derived from the domestic laws of contracting states. 54 
The Court of Appeal concluded that the concept of beneficial ownership 
was incompatible with that of a formal owner who does not have "the 
full privilege to directly benefit from the income".55 On the facts of the 
case, looking at the legal, commercial and practical structure, neither 
the Mauritian nor the suggested Dutch company could be perceived as 
beneficial owners.56 Rather, they were mere administrators of the income.57 
51. According to this scenario, on payment of interest by Indofood, the funds would 
have moved from Indofood, to the Dutch company, to the Mauritian company, to the 
noteholders. The debt owed by Indofood to the Mauritian company would have been 
novated to the Dutch company. In other words, when the Dutch company paid the inter­
est to the Mauritian company, the Dutch company would be discharging a liability (the 
novated debt) to that company. 
52. The reason why the case was litigated in English courts was because there was a 
"governing law" clause providing to that effect. 
53. As a corollary, the setting up of a Dutch company was not a reasonable measure 
that Indofood could have undertaken to avoid the adverse consequences from the change 
of law. 
54. lndofood v. JP Morgan (2006), Para. 42 (Lord Justice Chadwick). 
55. ld., Para. 42. 
56. In Para. 42, Lord Justice Chadwick pointed out that the fact that neither the 
Mauritian nor the suggested Dutch company were or could be a trustee, agent or nominee 
for the noteholders or anyone else in relation to the interest received from Indofood was 
"by no means conclusive". Nor was the absence of any entitlement of a noteholder to 
security over the interest received from Indofood. However, in his subsequent analysis, 
beneficial ownership was dismissed. 
57. Id., Para. 44. 
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Following this decision, in a guidance note issued on 9 October 2006,58 
Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs (HMRC) confirmed that the Court 
of Appeal 's decision was consistent with existing HMRC policy. HMRC 
found that the decision was binding insofar as it related to construing 
beneficial ownership in the context of the United Kingdom's tax treaties. 
Therefore, the international fiscal meaning of beneficial ownership and the 
test of full privilege to directly benefit from the income are considered to 
be applicable in the UK context. This test has been criticized in the United 
Kingdom as being too limited.59 
Reading this case, it appears that the Court of Appeal focused more on 
what the intermediate entity does or can do with the income, i.e. its narrow 
powers, rather than anything. The Court seems to have applied a technical 
test. Rather than look at the overall substance of the scheme and effec­
tively the end-result, the Court emphasized the specific payment and cash­
flow arrangements60 and how those affected the economic credibility of the 
intermediate entity. 
In the Bank of Scotland61 case, the French Supreme Administrative Court 
followed a similar approach. Here, a US parent concluded a usufruct 
agreement62 with a UK bank. Under this usufruct agreement, the UK bank 
acquired for a three-year period fixed dividend coupons attached to the 
(non-voting preferred) shares of the French subsidiary of the US parent 
58. Available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/intmanual/updates/intmupdate I 01007. 
htm. 
59. See, for example, Fraser, R., and J.D.B. Oliver, "Treaty Shopping and Beneficial 
Ownership: Indofood International Finance Ltd v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA London 
Branch", BTR 4 (2006), 422-426; Mehta, N. V. and K. Habershon, "U.K. Tax Authorities 
Issue Draft Guidance in Wake of Indofood Decision", Doc 2006-22678 or 2006 WTD 
216-2; Kandev, M., "Beneficial Ownership: Indofood Run Wild", CCH Tax Topics 
No. 1812 (30 November 2006), p. 1; Baker, P., "Beneficial Owner: After Indofood", 
VI Grays Inn Tax Chamber Review 1, (2007), p. 15; Mehta, N.Y. and K. Habershon, Doc 
2006-22678 or 2006 WTD 216-2; Bundgaard, J. and N. Winther-S!i!rensen, "Beneficial 
Ownership in International Financing Structures", 50 Tax Notes Int'/7 (2008), p. 587. 
60. Two business days before the due date for the payment of interest to the notehold­
ers, Indofood was to pay the Mauritian subsidiary. One business day before the due date, 
the Mauritian subsidiary was to pay the paying agent. On the due date, the paying agent 
was to pay the noteholders. 
61. Conseil d'Etat, 29 December 2006, Ministre de l'Economie, des Finances et de 
l'Industrie c/Societe Bank of Scotland, No. 283314; Revue de Droit Fiscal No. 4/2007, 
p. 34, Sec. 87. See Sheppard, L., "Indo food and Bank of Scotland: Who Is the Beneficial 
Owner?", 45 Tax Notes Int'l 5 (2007), p. 406; HJI Panayi, C., "Recent Developments to 
the OECD Model Tax Treaty and EC Law", 47 European Taxation 10 (2007), p. 452. 
62. A usufruct is a civil law concept. It is the legal right to use and derive profit or ben­
efit from property that belongs to another person, as long as the property is not damaged. 
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company. The usufruct contract was structured in such a way that the UK 
bank, in fact, undertook very little risk of default. 63 
The French company later on distributed dividends to the bank which were 
subject to a 25% withholding tax. Under Art. 9 of the applicable France­
UK tax treaty, the maximum withholding tax was 15%. The tax treaty also 
provided for a transfer of the avoir fiscal tax credit. The UK bank requested 
a refund of the French withholding tax levied in excess of the maximum 
rate of 15% and the avoir fiscal tax credit as provided by the tax treaty. 
The French tax administration rejected the claim on the basis that the 
beneficial owner of the dividend distribution was not the UK bank but the 
US parent. The case ended up in the Supreme Administrative Court, which 
agreed with the tax administration, in that the transaction implemented 
by the contracting parties in reality concealed a loan agreement between 
the UK bank and the US parent which was remunerated by the payment 
of the avoir fiscal tax credit to the UK bank. The Supreme Administrative 
Court concentrated on the fact that the price paid by the UK bank to the US 
parent to acquire the dividend coupons corresponded to the amount of the 
dividends, before the levying of withholding tax. The beneficial owner of the 
dividends was, in fact, the US parent. The US parent merely delegated to its 
French subsidiary the repayment of the loan contracted with the UK bank. 
Again, although the Supreme Administrative Court looked at the overall 
scheme, in its analysis, it focused on specific elements, such as the payment 
arrangement and the question of risk. What was crucial to the French tax 
administration and to the Supreme Administrative Court was the fact that 
the return to the UK bank was pre-determined and guaranteed. A possible 
default of the French subsidiary would not have affected the UK bank. All 
these factors pointed to a loan rather than the usufruct agreement described 
by the parties. 
A similarly factual approach was followed in the Prevost case.64 Here, a 
Netherlands company (Prevost Holding) was owned 49% by a UK company 
63. The US parent had guaranteed the return and agreed to indemnify the UK bank 
against government failure to refund the avoir fiscal. The amount of tbe dividends was 
also predetermined. In addition, tbe usufruct contract contained an acceleration clause 
entitling the UK bank to sell the shares back to tbe US parent on a change in the appli­
cable tax law. 
64. Kandev, M. "Prevost Car: Canada's First Word on Beneficial Ownership", 50 Tax 
Notes Int'l 7 (2008), p. 526; Summerhill, L., J. Bernstein and B. Womdl, "Taxpayer 
Prevails in Canadian Beneficial Ownership Case", 50 Tax Notes Int'l 5 (2008), p. 363; 
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(Henlys) and 5 1% by a Swedish company (Volvo). Volvo had acquired 
all the shares of a Canadian company (Prevost) in 1 995 and immediately 
thereafter transferred them to Prevost Holding. Volvo then sold 49% of its 
shares in Prevost Holding to Henlys. Prevost paid around CAD 80 million 
of dividends to Prevost Holding in the 1996 to 1 999 and 2001 tax years. 
The Canadian tax authorities withheld tax at 5%. Prevost Holding was 
not subject to Netherlands tax on dividends from Prevost because of the 
Netherlands participation exemption. 
Under the Canada-Netherlands tax treaty, the 5% rate applied if the 
dividend recipient was a company that owned at least 25% of the capital or 
at least 10% of the voting power in the company paying the dividends.65 The 
Canadian tax authorities refused to allow the application of the Canada­
Netherlands tax treaty by maintaining that Prevost Holding was not the 
beneficial owner of the dividends received from Prevost. This was because 
Prevost Holding did not have any office, assets, activities or employees in 
the Netherlands, its only asset consisted of the shares in Prevost and all its 
expenses were paid by its shareholders. The dividends paid by Prevost were 
treated as if they had been paid to Henlys and Volvo directly. As a result, 
49% of the dividends were subject to tax at the 10% rate of the Canada-UK 
tax treaty and 5 1% of the dividends were subject to tax at the 15% rate of 
the Canada-Sweden tax treaty. 66 
The taxpayer objected to this treatment, arguing that Prevost Holding was 
entitled to the benefits of the Canada-Netherlands tax treaty. The taxpayer 
also argued that this company structure was a common form of business 
structure where two or more companies pooled their resources to carry on a 
joint business and that the structure did not have any unusual or tax-driven 
aspects. 
Kandev, M.N. and B. Wiener, "Some thoughts on the Use of Later OECD Commentaries 
After Prevost Car", 54 Tax Notes lnt'l 8 (2009), p. 667; Panayi, 47 European Taxation 
10 (2007), p. 452; Holderman, S., "Tour d'Horizon of the Term 'Beneficial Owner"', 
54 Tax Notes /nt'/1 0  (2009), p. 881 ;  Krishna, V., "Using Beneficial Ownership to Prevent 
Treaty Shopping", 56 Tax Notes /nt'/7 (2009), p. 537; Bernstein, J. and L. Summerhill, 
"Canadian Court Respects Dutch Holding Company", WTD 43-2 (9 March 2009), 
Doc 2009-4953. 
65. Art. 10(2) Netherlands-Canada tax treaty. 
66. The Canadian tax authorities initially applied the 5% rate under Art. 10(2)(a) of 
the Canada-Sweden tax treaty for certain years, but then revised the rate to 15% in a 
subsequent reassessment. Art. 10(2)(a) of the Canada-Sweden tax treaty provides for 
a 5% rate if the beneficial owner of the dividend is a company that directly controls at 
least 10% of the voting power of the dividend payer or directly holds at least 25% of 
its capital. 
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The Tax Court of Canada67 and later on the Federal Court of Appeal68 
agreed with the taxpayer in that Prevost Holding was the beneficial owner 
of the dividends. The Federal Court of Appeal concurred with the judg­
ment of Chief Justice Rip of the Tax Court in that the beneficial owner of 
dividends is the person who receives the dividends for his or her own use 
and enjoyment and assumes the risk and control of the dividend he or she 
received. 69 
"Where an agency or mandate exists or the property is in the name of a 
nominee, one looks to find on whose behalf the agent or mandatary is act­
ing or for whom the nominee has lent his or her name. When corporate 
entities are concerned, one does not pierce the corporate veil unless the 
corporation is a conduit for another person and has absolutely no discre­
tion as to the use or application of funds put through it as conduit, or has 
agreed to act on someone else 's behalf pursuant to that person's instruc­
tions without any right to do other than what that person instructs it, for 
example, a stockbroker who is the registered owner of the shares it holds 
for clients."70 
The relationship between Prevost Holding and its shareholders was not one 
of agency, or mandate. Prevost Holding was not a conduit for Volvo and 
Henlys and could not be said to have absolutely no discretion as to the use 
or application of funds put through it as a conduit. The Courts reasoned as 
follows. 
There was no predetermined or automatic flow of funds to Volvo and 
Henlys. Prevost Holding's Deed of Incorporation did not obligate it to 
pay any dividends to its shareholders. In fact, Henlys and Volvo could not 
take action against Prevost Holding for failure to pay dividends. Prevost 
Holding was the registered owner of Prevost shares, paid for the shares 
and owned the shares for itself. When dividends were received by Prevost 
Holding in respect of shares it owned, the dividends were the property of 
Prevost Holding and were available to its creditors, if any, until such time as 
the management board declared a dividend and the dividend was approved 
by the shareholders.71 
67. Prevost Car Inc. v. The Queen , 2008 TCC 23 1 (22 April 2008). Judgment by the 
Associate Chief Justice Rip. 
68. Prevost Car Inc. v. T he Queen, 2009 FCA 57 (26 February 2009). 
69. Id., Para. 13,  citing Para. 100 in 2008 TCC 23 1 .  
70. ld. 
7 1 .  Id., Para. 1 6 ,  citing Paras. 100-105 in 2008 TCC 23 1 .  
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Therefore, Prevost Holding, being the beneficial owner of the dividends, 
was entitled to the benefit of the reduced rate of tax on dividends under the 
Canada-Netherlands tax treaty. 
Broadly, in this case, the real powers of the intermediary company and its 
relationship with the parent company were crucial. The courts focused on 
the governance model of the intermediary company, its actual management 
and the composition of its parent company's board. The ownership of the 
income received, the discretion to use, enjoy and dispose of it, as well as 
issues of risk and control, were addressed. 
As in Indofood, the arrangement was not to be dismantled. Of course, 
the difference between the two cases is that in Indofood, a finding of 
no beneficial ownership of an intermediary (which ought to have been 
inserted, according to the trustee of the bondholder) protected the existing 
arrangement and enabled Jndofood to redeem the notes early. By contrast, 
in Prevost, a finding of beneficial ownership of the intermediary protected 
the arrangement and the reduced withholding taxes of the underlying tax 
treaties applied. 
However, in all of the above cases, the courts seem to have proceeded on 
an ad hoc and factual basis. The existence (or lack of) beneficial owner­
ship was to be considered on the facts of each case, taking into account 
some of the factors mentioned above (ownership, risk, discretion, etc.) in 
a non-exhaustive manner. Whilst clear cases of abuse/sham may have been 
easily detected, there was no bright-line test for the less abusive but still 
to an extent contrived situations. Much depended on how national courts 
perceived and interpreted beneficial ownership in their own jurisdictions, 
independently of judicial precedents in other jurisdictions. 
As a result of the lack of bright-line tests and the ad hoc application of ben­
eficial ownership, taxpayers are faced with uncertainty when structuring 
arrangements that are akin to treaty shopping arrangements. Furthermore, 
the threshold test of business legitimacy with which the intermediary is 
to be imbued so as not to be part of a treaty shopping arrangement may 
differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In other words, the benchmark of 
impropriety may shift with time and with location. This is hardly surpris­
ing, given the theoretical limitations of the treaty shopping polemic. 
Neither does the United States seem to display a more uniform and coher­
ent approach to treaty shopping. This is examined below. 
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3.2. The US approach to treaty shopping 
The United States was the first country to advance objections to treaty shop­
ping.72 It remains the most vocal opponent to such practices. The Technical 
Explanation of the US Model, which describes treaty shopping, contains 
an unequivocal statement in that "tax treaties should include provisions 
that specifically prevent misuse of treaties by residents of third countries". 73 
Historically, however, the US attitude to treaty shopping had not always 
been so hostile. In fact, initially, the US fisc showed no particular concern 
over treaty shopping. After World War II, the US international tax policy 
focused on outbound rather than inbound investment. Its fiscal interests, 
mainly the minimization of foreign (source country) taxes imposed on US 
legal entities, were clearly influenced by its concerns as a country of resi­
dence. Therefore, treaty shopping was not a controversial issue in treaty 
negotiations as it worked to the advantage of the US fisc. If less tax was 
paid abroad by US persons, then less foreign tax credit depleting the US 
coffers was paid to such persons. 
In the 1980s, the transition from being a major country of residence to 
a country of source had begun. The US administration concentrated its 
initiatives on attracting foreign capital, in order to help finance domestic 
investment. Inter alia, it exempted portfolio gains from taxation to 
encourage foreigners to invest in the US markets,74 rendering the US "a 
sort of tax haven for foreign portfolio investment".75 At the same time, it 
tried to discourage outbound investment.76 Gradually, the country became 
the word's largest debtor with a huge trade deficit. Therefore, the US fisc 
became increasingly concerned with reduction of source taxes via treaty 
shopping. Treaty shopping was not only disliked because it caused an 
72. In fact, most of the literature mentioned in 2.2. above originates in the United 
States. See, for example, Rosenbloom and Langbein, 19 Colum. J. Transnational Law 
(1981), pp. 396-7; Reinhold, 53 Tax Lawyer 3 (2000), p. 663; Oliva, R., "The Treasury's 
Twenty Year Battle with Treaty Shopping: Art. 16 of the 1977 United States Model 
Treaty", 14 Ga. J. Int'l & Camp. L. (1984), p. 293. 
73. See Technical Explanation on Art. 22 of US Model. 
74. See Foreign Investors Tax Act (1966). 
75. Haug, S.M., "The United States Policy of Stringent Anti-Treaty Shopping 
Provisions: A Comparative Analysis", 29 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
(1996), p. 191 (p. 239). 
76. See Interest Equalisation Tax Act (1964) which restricted portfolio investment by 
US persons in long-term debt obligations of foreign issuers. 
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untoward erosion of source-based taxation. It was also objectionable as it 
often involved tax havens. 
The United States had no limitation on treaty shopping until l 984, although 
certain cases limited the use of treaties in abusive situations. In Aiken 
Industries , the Tax Court held that the reduction of withholding tax under 
the US-Honduras treaty did not apply to back-to-back loans with identical 
interest payments between a US payer, a related Honduras corporation, and 
the Bahamas parent corporation. The court held that the treaty required that 
the recipient of the payment have "dominion and control" over the funds 
and that this requirement was not met when the Honduran corporation was 
a mere conduit. 77 
In 1984, the United States terminated the extension of its treaty with the 
Netherlands to the Netherlands Antilles, which was used by many US 
corporations as the location of finance subsidiaries that borrowed on the 
Eurobond market and onlent the funds to the US parent. At the same time, 
the IRS issued two Revenue Rulings applying the precedent of Aiken 
Industries even to situations where there is a "spread" between the two 
loans or when one payment is interest and the other a dividend.78 
Subsequently, the United States began to incorporate LOB provisions 
first into the Internal Revenue Code and then into treaties. In 1986, the 
branch profit tax provision was adopted with a "qualified resident" defini­
tion that overrode treaties. 79 The US-Germany treaty from 1989 was the 
first to include an LOB provision, and all subsequent US treaties include 
LOB provisions, so that now there are almost no US treaties without such 
provisions. 
In addition, in 1993 Congress authorized the IRS to adopt regulations 
involving "conduit arrangements" in multiple-party financing transac­
tions.80 The regulations adopted by the IRS follow the 1 984 rulings and 
apply to a wide range of financing transactions, and they also constitute a 
treaty override.81 
77. Aiken Industries v. Inc Commissioner , 56 TC 925 ( 197 1).  
78. Rev. Rul. 84- 153, 1984-2 CB 383; Rev. Rul. 84- 152, 1984-2 CB 381;  see also 
Rev. Rul. 85-163, 1 985-2 CB 349 and Rev Rul 89-1 10, 1989-2 CB 275. 
79. IRC 884(e), 884(f)(3). 
80. IRC 7701(1). 
8 1 .  Treas. Reg. 1 .881 -3. 
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It is not clear to what extent these provisions are effective to prevent treaty 
shopping. For example, in the period between 1997 and 2001 many public 
US corporations engaged in "inversion" transactions in which they became 
subsidiaries of new public corporations in Bermuda. Bermuda does not 
have a treaty with the United States so for treaty purposes the new parent 
corporations qualified as residents of Barbados. Subsequently, the new par­
ent would lend funds to the US subsidiary which would deduct the interest 
and pay no withholding tax under the Barbados treaty. The LOB provi­
sion in the treaty proved ineffective because it does not apply to public 
corporations (even though the corporation was traded in New York, not in 
Barbados). 
The ambiguity as to what is treaty shopping and as such improper use 
of tax treaties and what is mere tax planning and as such legitimate is 
reflected in the case law. US case law since Aiken Industries has tended 
not to side with the IRS even in situations which clearly involved treaty 
shopping. 
For example, in Northern Indiana Public Utilities the Court of Appeals 
rejected the IRS' attempt to apply a substance over form or economic 
substance analysis to a Netherlands Antilles finance subsidiary.82 In SDI 
Industries the Tax Court rejected the IRS attempt to argue that when a 
Netherlands corporation licensed software from its Netherlands Antilles 
subsidiary and sublicensed it to a US affiliate, neither the royalty payments 
from the United States to the Netherlands nor from the Netherlands to the 
Antilles were subject to US withholding tax. 83 
Recent US treaties (e.g. with the Netherlands and Switzerland) include 
elaborate LOB provisions that are much more complex than the provision 
in the 2006 US Model. These provisions were generally negotiated by the 
other side to the treaty and indicate that despite the professed US hostility to 
all forms of treaty shopping and its insistence on including LOB provisions 
in all new US treaties, in practice these provisions can be negotiated to 
address the concerns of the treaty partner and create opportunities for tax 
planning. 
Therefore, the US approach to treaty shopping is, to an extent, also 
beleaguered by lack of uniformity. Even the LOBs in its tax treaty network 
82. NorthemlndianaPublic Service Co. v. Commissioner; 1 15F.3d506(7th Cir. 1997). 
83. SDI Netherlands v. Commissioner , 107 TC 161 (1996). The case was decided for 
a tax year before there was an LOB provision in the Netherlands treaty. 
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show variable degrees of severity which may exonerate a range of arrange­
ments. This approach seems to be perpetuated in recent US tax treaties. 
Overall, as far as treaty shopping is concerned, we identify variable stan­
dards and shifting benchmarks of impropriety. What are the implications 
of this conclusion in the EU context? This is examined in the final part of 
this paper. 
4. Treaty shopping and EU law 
In this section, we consider the effect of EU law on treaty shopping and 
anti-treaty-shopping provisions. In the past few years, the compatibility 
of anti-treaty-shopping provisions with EU law has been a topic of intense 
debate. It has been argued that anti-treaty-shopping provisions and espe­
cially the LOB are in breach of the freedom of establishment and/or the free 
movement of capital.84 May Member States include anti-treaty-shopping 
provisions in tax treaties between themselves or with non-EU Member 
States? 
For this argument to succeed, it has to be shown that treaty shopping, i.e. 
the activity that these anti-abuse provisions seek to curb, is an activity pro­
tected under EU law. Of course, there has to be genuine (cross-border) 
activity; the more abusive the structure, the less likely that the fundamental 
freedoms will be triggered at all. For, if the intermediary entity is a com­
plete sham, then, arguably, there is no genuine exercise of establishment in 
that jurisdiction nor is there any movement of capital. Therefore, the more 
economic substance there is in the intermediary company itself, the more 
likely that the setting up of the establishment itself will be recognized as an 
84. See, for example, HJI Panayi, C., "Open Skies for EC Tax?", BTR 3 (2 003), 
p. 189; Kofler, G. W., "European Taxation Under an 'Open Sky': LoB Clauses in Tax 
Treaties Between the U.S. and the EU Member States", 35 Tax Notes International 
1(2 004), p. 45; Hinnekens, L., "Compatibility of Bilateral Tax Treaties with European 
Community Law - The Rules", EC Tax Review 4 ( 1994), p. 146; Hinnekens, L., 
"Compatibility of Bilateral Tax Treaties with European Community Law- Application of 
the Rules", EC Tax Review 4 ( 1995), p. 2 02; Doyle, H., "Is Article 2 6  of the Netherlands­
United States Tax Treaty Compatible With EC Law?", 35 European Taxation l ( 1996), 
p. 14; Martin-Jimenez, A.J., "EC Law and Clauses on 'Limitation of Benefits' in Treaties 
with the U.S. after Maastricht and the U.S.-Netherlands Tax Treaty", EC Tax Review 
2 (1995), p. 78; Anders, D., "The Limitation on Benefits Clause of the U.S.-German 
Tax Treaty and Its Compatibility With European Union Law", 18 Nw. J. lnt'l L. & 
Bus. ( 1997), p. 165; Essers/de Bont/Kemmeren (eds.) The Compatibility of Anti-Abuse 
Provisions in Tax Treaties with EC Law (The Hague: Kluwer international, 1998). 
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activity that could be prima facie covered by the freedom of establishment. 
Similarly, the more economic substance there is in the intermediary, the 
more likely that investment through it will be prima facie covered by the 
free movement of capital. 
Assuming this first threshold issue is satisfied and the aforementioned fun­
damental freedoms are prima facie engaged, is there a restriction to them? 
From a freedom of establishment perspective, it could be argued that treaty 
shopping, i.e. the use of the intermediary entity located in a favourable tax 
jurisdiction to effect the investment, is an exercise of freedom of estab­
lishment. The possibility that the intermediary entity has limited economic 
substance (but is short of a complete sham for threshold purposes) ought 
not prevent this from being characterized as an exercise of establishment. 
An analogy may be drawn with a line of non-tax related cases (Centros85/ 
Uberseering86). These cases dealt with corporate forum shopping. Here, the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) approved the formation of primary and 
secondary establishments, even if they lacked economic substance in one 
Member State and were thought to have been set up in order to circumvent 
the company law formation requirements applicable in another Member 
State.87 Just because the undertaking was corporate forum shopping within 
the European Union with little economic substance in the establishment 
did not necessarily mean that the protection under the freedom of establish­
ment was withdrawn. Can this strand of reasoning also apply with treaty 
shopping? Does the fact that treaty shopping entails tax-location shopping 
rather than corporate forum shopping change matters? 
There is no reason why it should, at least prima facie. It could be argued that 
treaty shopping is an exercise of establishment, regardless of the motives 
behind it. What anti-treaty-shopping provisions tend to do is to disregard 
the intermediary entity and treat another company as the ultimate recipi­
ent of the income. Therefore, it could be argued that anti-treaty-shopping 
provisions restrict the freedom of establishment. Of course, this restriction 
could be justified, as explained below, but this is nonetheless a restriction. 
85. ECJ 9 March 1999, C-212/97, Centros [ 1999] ECR 1-1459. 
86. ECJ 5 November 2002, C-208/00, Oberseering [2002] ECR 1-9919. 
87. For recent analysis, see HJI Panayi, C., "Corporate Mobility under Private 
International Law and European Community Law: Debunking Some Myths", in 
Eeckhout(Tridimas (eds.) Yearbook of European Law, Vol. 28 (Oxford. Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 124. 
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From a free movement of capital perspective, it could be argued that a 
treaty shopper exercises its free movement of capital by investing in a com­
pany indirectly (i.e. through another Member State entity) and as a result 
receiving its return from such investment indirectly. The analysis here 
focuses on the existence (or lack of) indirect investment rather than the use 
of an intermediary entity. The issue is not so much the fact of establishing 
a related entity through which investment is made. What is important is the 
fact that the treaty shopper (whether EU national or not) takes advantage 
of the tax treaty network of another Member State in order to invest in a 
third Member State, by channelling income through an intermediary entity 
which it does not control. 
In other words, this is an instance of indirect rather than direct investment 
(investment through a related entity) and as such, prima facie protected 
under the free movement of capital. Anti-treaty-shopping provisions tend 
to disregard the intermediary entity and/or re-characterize the payment as 
being directly made to another company. As a result, they may ultimately 
make the investment of capital through an intermediary in another Member 
State more expensive. Therefore, it could be argued that anti-treaty­
shopping provisions restrict the free movement of capital. 
Of course, as under freedom of establishment, this restriction could be 
justified by imperative requirements in the general interest. It also has to 
be suitable and proportional.88 Not every kind of structure will ultimately 
be protected under EU law. 
For example, the restriction could be justified on the basis of preventing 
tax avoidance/evasion.89 In order for this ground to succeed, the anti-treaty­
shopping provisions must have the specific purpose of preventing wholly 
artificial arrangements.90 Broad anti-abuse clauses which do not distin­
guish between bona fide activities and abusive situations have been struck 
88. ECJ 30 November 1995, C-55/94, Gebhard [1995] ECR 1-4165, Para. 37. 
89. See, for example, ECJ 16 July 1998, C-264/96, ICI [ 1998] ECR 1-4695; ECJ 1 1  
March 2004, C-9/02, Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Ministere de L'Economie des 
Finances et de l'lndustrie [2004] ECR I-02409. The ECJ tends to use the terms "avoid­
ance" and "evasion" without distinction. In some cases, it refers to the justification as 
being based on tax avoidance (e.g. ECJ 16 July 1998, C-264/96, IC/, Para. 26), whereas 
in others (usually more recent ones), it referred to tax evasion (e.g. ECJ 1 2  December 
2002, C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst, Para. 37; ECJ 2 1  November 2002, C-436/00, X and 
Y, Para. 62). 
90. ECJ 21 November 2002, C-264/96, ICI, Para. 26; ECJ 12 December 2002, 
C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst, Para. 37. 
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down.91 Prevention of tax avoidance/evasion could, therefore, exonerate a 
restrictive treaty provision if this is sufficiently targeted to that end. The 
provision must also be suitable and must not go beyond what is necessary 
to attain the objective pursued, whether this is prevention of tax evasion or 
tax avoidance. 
Therefore, if less than wholly artificial arrangements are caught by an anti­
treaty-shopping provision, then the restriction is unlikely to be justified. As 
a corollary, the more artificial the treaty-shopping arrangement, the more 
likely it is to have tax avoidance connotations - against which an anti­
treaty-shopping provision can more readily be justified. It should be noted 
that obtaining a mere tax saving is not tax avoidance/evasion in the eyes of 
the ECJ.92 Loss of revenue and erosion of tax base has not been accepted 
as a justification by the ECJ.93 In any case, as explained above,94 treaty 
shopping has not unequivocally proved to be fiscally harmful. 
The restriction could also be justified on the basis of safeguarding the 
allocation of tax jurisdiction.95 It could be argued that what anti-treaty­
shopping provisions seek to do is restore the allocation choices of the tax 
treaty shopped. If State S wanted to grant the same tax concessions to State 
P and State R, it would have done so. As the original allocation choices of 
the relevant tax treaties are respected under EU law after the D. case,96 so 
should measures to protect and restore those allocation choices. 
91 .  See 12 December 2002, C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst, Paras. 34-38; 
ECJ I I  March 2004, C-9/02, Lasteyrie du Saillant ,  Para. 50. 
92. See, for example, ECJ 26 October 1999, C-294/97, Eurowings Luftverkehr [ 1999] 
ECR I -7 44 7, Para. 44 and other cases cited therein. 
93. See, for example, ECJ 2 1  November 2002, C-264/96 ICI, Para. 28; 
ECJ 21 September 1999, C-307/97, Saint-Gobain [ 1999] ECR I-6161 ,  Para. 50; 
ECJ 12 December 2002, C-385/00 De Groot [2002] ECR I-1 1 819, Para. 103. 
94. See 2.2. and the analysis on Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan [2003]6 
ITLR 233; (2003) SOL 6 19. 
95. See Case ECJ 5 July 2005, C-376/03, D [2005] ECR I-5821 ;  ECJ 13 December 
2005, C-446/03 Marks & Spencer [2005] ECR I-10837; ECJ 18 July 2007, C-23 1/05, 
OyAA [2007] ECR I-6373; ECJ 7 September 2006, C-470/04, N [2006] ECR I-74091; 
ECJ 15 May 2008, C-414/06, Lidl Belgium GmbH & Co KG/Finanzamt Heilbronn 
[2008] ECR I-3601 ,  Para. 5 1 ;  ECJ 1 7  September 2009, C-1 82/08, Glaxo Wellcome 
GmbH & Co. KG v. Finanzamt Miinchen II, Para. 88. 
96. In the D case, the ECJ accepted the allocation attained in the relevant tax treaties, 
even if this meant that some non-residents were treated more harshly than other non­
residents. The ECJ found that the Netherlands was not obliged to extend to a German 
resident the treaty benefits given to Belgian residents. The Germany-Netherlands tax 
treaty did not provide for the same allowances as the Belgium-Netherlands tax treaty. 
This was a question of pre-agreed allocation of tax powers between these States. The 
relevant treaties were not to be interfered with by extending benefits given to Belgian 
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Certainly, the application of this justification has to be finely tuned 
and proportional. The allocation of tax jurisdiction is less threatened 
by intermediary entities imbued with economic substance. The more 
substance there is in the treaty shopping arrangement, the less likely that 
the allocation scheme under the underlying tax treaty would be frustrated. 
Anti-treaty-shopping provisions have to factor that in. 
Also, the applicability of this ground as an imperative requirement could 
depend on the actual effect of the anti-treaty-shopping provisions on the 
structure. Do they restore the original withholding tax rate that would have 
applied absent the treaty shopping arrangement or do they impose a (penal) 
statutory withholding tax rate? If the former, then it could be argued that 
what the anti-treaty-shopping provision actually does is to restore the treaty 
balance. However, if the statutory withholding tax rate applies, then it is 
more difficult to see how the anti-treaty-shopping provision restores the 
treaty balance, since that balance is itself overridden. 
A point to note is that under the free movement of capital, it does not matter 
whether the capital movement is to or from a non-Member State, so long 
as there is some capital movement to or from a Member State. However, 
this could be relevant at the justification stage.97 A restriction may be more 
readily justified if it affects third-country nationals than if it affects EU 
nationals. Nevertheless, this has to be proven. Another point to note is that 
the freedom of establishment is only available to EU nationals. Therefore, 
if the intermediary entity is in a non-EU Member State, then ari anti-treaty-
residents also to German residents. The current tendency of the ECJ seems to be 
respect for the allocation choices enshrined in tax treaties. See, for example, ECJ 1 5  
May 2008, C-414/06, Lidl Belgium [2008] ECR 1-3601 ,  Para. 5 1 ;  ECJ 1 7  September 
2009, C-182/08, Glaxo Wellcome GmbH & Co. KG v. Finanzamt Miinchen II, Para. 88. 
The only case which explicitly dealt with anti-treaty-shopping provisions is the ACT 
Group Litigation case. Here, both the Advocate General and the ECJ refrained from 
using tax treaty allocation as a justification for a restriction. Instead, reliance was placed 
on non-comparability. However, the overtone of both the Opinion and the judgment is 
respect for tax treaties. The tax treaty package represented an equilibrium, into which 
no enquiries could have been sustained. ECJ 1 2  December 2006, C-374/04, ACT Group 
Litigation, Paras. 88-91. For further analysis, see Chapter 5 in HJI Panayi, C., Double 
Taxation, Tax Treaties, Treaty Shopping and the European Community (2007). 
97. See, for example, ECJ 1 2  December 2006, C-446/04, FII Group Litigation case 
[2006] ECR 1-1 1753, Paras. 169-172; ECJ 13 March 2007, C-524/04 T hin Cap Group 
Litigation [2007] ECR 1-2107; ECJ 18  December 2007, C-101/05 Case A [2007] ECR 
1-1 153 1 ;  ECJ 23 April 2008, C-201/05 T he Test Claimants in the CFC and Dividend 
Group Litigation v. HMRC [2008] STC 15 1 3; ECJ 19 November 2009, C-540/07 
Commission v. Italy [2009] ECR I-0000. 
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shopping provision frustrating the arrangement may not be incompatible 
with EU law. 
In conclusion, it is possible that anti-treaty-shopping provisions restrict the 
freedom of establishment and/or the free movement of capital. However, 
they could be justified, depending on how these provisions are phrased, 
whether they are sufficiently targeted against wholly artificial arrange­
ments and proportional. It also depends on whether these provisions try to 
curb treaty shopping through a non-EU Member State. 
The recent trend, however, at the ECJ level appears to be respect for the 
allocation of taxing rights under a tax treaty and, generally, respect for tax 
treaties. 
5. Conclusion 
The first author has repeatedly stated his belief that an underlying principle 
of the international tax regime is the single tax principle, i.e. that cross­
border flows of income should be subject to some tax and that double non­
taxation should be addressed as much as double taxation.98 The rationale 
is that double non-taxation weakens countries ' ability to tax income by 
encouraging shifting income from domestic to cross-border activities. This 
view implies that reduction of tax by the source country should be premised 
on actual taxation by the residence country. 
There is no question that this view was not always taken by any country; 
the first US tax treaty ( 1937) was with France at a time when the US system 
was purely territorial so that reduction of source taxation was not accom­
panied by residence taxation. However, the introduction of LOB provisions 
into US tax treaties and into the OECD Commentary indicate that this view 
is gaining ground and it may apply even in situations that are not purely 
abusive. 
Nevertheless, this paper has shown that actual treaty practice and case law 
fall far short of implementing the single tax principle. In most cases anti­
treaty shopping provisions are either absent or applied only to pure con­
duit situations. This may reflect the unclear theoretical basis to the attack 
98. Avi-Yonah, R.S., International Tax as International Law: An Analysis of the 
International Tax Regime, Cambridge Tax Law Series (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), Chapter 10. 
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on treaty shopping in general, or (as in the India/Mauritius case) practical 
constraints stemming from tax competition. In any case, this debate is 
likely to continue. 
As far as treaty shopping within the European Union is concerned, special 
considerations would seem to apply. If anti-treaty-shopping provisions are 
targeted against wholly artificial arrangements, then it is more likely that 
they will be compatible with EU law. However, as was shown in section 3. ,  
anti-treaty-shopping provisions may not be targeted against such arrange­
ments only. In fact, provisions such as beneficial ownership can be so 
vague that they can be subject to different interpretations, catching a wider 
or narrower array of arrangements in each jurisdiction. Whilst a wholly 
artificial arrangement may be more easily found when double non-taxation 
is in place, anti-treaty-shopping provisions are not always applied to that 
effect. Therefore, EU Member States should re-examine their tax treaty 
policies, to ensure that EU law safeguards are reflected in the application 
and interpretation of their anti-treaty-shopping provisions. 
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